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## II.—NOTES ON CICERO'S USE OF THE IMPERFECT AND PLUPERFECT SUBJUNCTIVE IN *SI*-CLAUSES.

Our traditional classification of *si*-clauses according to the mood and tense of the verb of the clause tends, perhaps, to distract attention from some other important features of the conditional sentence. It is the purpose of this paper to point out and illustrate some of the too much neglected or quite unnoticed characteristics of the *si*-clause. The observations are based upon a study of the independent subjunctive and of the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive in *si*-clauses, as found in Cicero's Orations. The present paper deals only with those conditional sentences which have either the imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive in both protasis and apodosis<sup>1</sup>: these will be referred to by the tenses found in each member; thus imperfect-imperfect form means imperfect in both protasis and apodosis, imperfect-pluperfect form means imperfect in protasis and pluperfect in apodosis, etc., the first member of the compound name describing in every case the protasis, and the second member, the apodosis.

### I. *Stress or Emphasis.*

It is a well-recognized fact that the words of a sentence are not all spoken with the same degree of intensity, but that those which connote ideas that are uppermost in the mind of the speaker receive a corresponding stress in utterance. This principle is not confined to one language, and is as true of a conditional clause as of any other syntactical combination. We are so familiar with the play of emphasis that we usually do not consciously appreciate it, but it requires very little observation to see that phrases differ very much in the distribution of their stress and its relative intensity.

A prime factor in logical, and therefore in stress, prominence is antithesis; for instance, one teacher might say to another, 'You have a poor class this year, I suppose'; the other replies, 'No, I

<sup>1</sup> Sentences that are involved in other constructions, e. g. indirect discourse, are not included; the same is true of questions, which may have an independent subjunctive in the apodosis. The total number of cases treated is about 500.

have a very *good* class this year.' In the idea behind the reply, *good* stands out in antithesis to *poor*, and therefore in utterance the word *good*, reinforced by *very*, has the sentence-accent. How strong this mental prominence is, may be inferred from the fact that had the second person replied, 'No, a very *good* one,' his meaning would have been perfectly clear. This optional suppression of subject and verb can only mean that the ideas they connote are an accessory part of the thought—that its essential feature is the new conception *good*, which is in sharp contrast to *poor* (whereas the conceptions that do not find expression are a virtual repetition of those of the first speaker). These principles have an important bearing on the conditional sentence.

Of all varieties of *si*-clause, perhaps the unreal condition is the one in which sharp antitheses may most logically be expected; for, in its very essence, the unreal condition is an opposition to some reality clearly before the speaker's mind—no Roman, for instance, could have said '*si Romae Caesar esset*' without having clearly in mind that Caesar was at some other definite place (as the position of *Romae* might lead us to assume), or, at least, that he was away from Rome. The following sentences show the working of antithesis:

in Cat. I 7. 17: *Servi* mehercule *mei* *si* me isto pacto metuerent, ut te metuunt omnes *cives tui*, domum meam relinquendam putarem.

de Har. Resp. 8. 16: Quae quidem ego *si* aut *per me* aut *ab aliis* haberem, non praedicarem apud vos, ne . . . : sed cum sint mihi data a *vobis*, . . . non . . . vereor . . .

de Leg. Agr. II 3. 6: Quodsi *solus* in discrimen aliquod adducerer, ferrem, Quirites, animo aequiore.

p. Clu. 29. 80: At *tum* *si* dicerem, non audirer, non quod alia res esset: immo eadem, sed tempus aliud.

In the third example cited, *solus* is followed by *vos universos*, and in the fourth *tum* is preceded by *nunc*; in the other cases the contrasted words are within the limits of the passage; in two cases the stressed word or words precede *si*.

It will be at once noted that in no case does the stress fall upon the *verb* of the *si*-clause; applying the principles set forth above it follows that *the verb is not necessarily the expression of the essence of a condition*.<sup>1</sup> Any doubt of the soundness of the

<sup>1</sup> For like cases see in Verr. II 1. 17. 44, II 3. 1. 3, II 5. 58. 150, in Cat. II 6. 12, p. Scauro I. 10, Phil. I 7. 18, X 8. 16, X 10. 20.

reasoning may be dispelled by a closer inspection; e. g. de Leg. Agr. II 3. 6 (cited above) has *solus* as the stressed word of its *si*-clause—stressed because it is the expression of the essential feature of the clause—namely, unreality;—if that one word were cut out and the verb were left to express the idea of unreality, it would reverse the meaning of the clause and make nonsense of the passage; for it is one thing to say, ‘If I were going into danger,’ implying I am not, and quite another to say, ‘If I *alone* were going into danger,’ implying that not only I but others are going. In the latter case the unreality of the clause is not inherent in the verbal idea of going (into danger), for the speaker *is* going, but rather in the manner of the going—‘alone’ as contrasted with ‘in the company of others.’

The last passage cited (p. Clu. 29. 80) illustrates the same point, for the unreality is not the *speaking* (*dicerem*), but its *time* or *circumstances*; *tum* refers to a definite time some years past, and with it we might have expected the pluperfect tense: it would seem, then, that *tum* stands for two elements, unreality and time—the first by virtue of its emphasis, the second by virtue of its signification. As we might say in English, ‘If I were living in the Middle Ages’: here the stress and meaning of the temporal expression allow the whole phrase to take the form of simple unreality instead of that of opposition to past reality.

It is to be observed that the stress may fall upon any element of the sentence—now the subject (e. g. in Cat. I 7. 17), now an adjunct of the verb. Further examples may be found in the passages cited in the last footnote.

If there be need of further evidence to show that the verb is not necessarily the essential part of a *si*-clause, it may be found in the following considerations:—

in Verr. II 1. 17. 44: nihil dicam nisi singulare, nisi id, quod si in *alium* reum diceretur, incredibile videretur.

In this sentence the verb *diceretur* plays a very weak rôle, for it is already implied in *dicam* above; hence, though it may sound a little crude, the same thought might have found expression in quod in *alium* reum incredibile videretur.<sup>1</sup>

In point of fact, just such shortened conditional sentences form a well-recognized class in Latin. Such sentences, though simple

<sup>1</sup> Other like examples are—

in Verr. II 5. 58. 150: si haec *apud Scythas* dicerem.

Phil. X 8. 16: si *ipse* viveret C. Caesar.

in form, by an emphatic word or phrase imply a condition, and hence perform the function of a complex sentence.

p. Q. Rosc. 17. 50: *vix me dius fidius tu, Fanni, a Ballione aut aliquo eius simili hoc ex postulare auderes et impetrare posses*; i. e. 'If you were dealing with a Ballio or his like.'

This sentence is merely an extreme case of the kind of formally complex sentence with which we have all along been dealing—namely, one whose conditional clause does not stress its verb; this takes the one essential word of the condition and incorporates it into the main clause.<sup>1</sup> Cicero has left us a pair of sentences which express a similar thought, but use in one case the full form, in the other the abbreviated:

Phil. X 10. 20: *Ita praeclara est recuperatio libertatis, ut ne mors quidem sit in repetenda libertate fugienda. Quodsi immortalitas consequeretur praesentis periculi fugam, tamen eo magis ea fugienda videretur, quo diuturnior servitus esset.*

Cicero is speaking of the readiness of other nations to endure anything rather than risk their remnant of life, and says that even immortality would be no boon at such a price.

p. Plancio 37. 90: *Mortem me timuisse dicis. Ego vero ne immortalitatem quidem contra rem publicam accipiendam putarem, nedum . . .*

In these sentences the conditional idea centers in *immortalitas* and *immortalitatem*, and it would seem that Cicero could have used either form he chose in the expression of each of the ideas. The first sentence in the short form might run, '*Endless life* even (to say nothing of our brief span) would be a poor reward of cowardice, for it would mean only a longer slavery'; the second, expanded, might read, 'If endless life (and not a brief span) were at stake, I would not think of accepting it, etc.'

It is hard to escape the conclusion that these two sentences are essentially alike, and, if so, that the preservation of the noun in the

<sup>1</sup> This short form would be clear to the hearer only in case the other elements of the sentence are sufficiently implied in what precedes; hence it is out of the question when the conditional clause is in antithesis to what is to follow, as de Leg. Agr. II 3. 6 (cited above): *Quodsi solus in discrimen aliquod adducerer, ferrem, Quirites, animo aequiore; sed mihi videntur certi homines . . . vos universos . . . vituperaturi*. If, on the other hand, he had wished to say, 'We are all running into danger,' he might have followed that by '*Alone*, I would not mind it,' and still made his thought clear. As it is, though the verb (as shown above) is not the main feature of the clause, it needs to be expressed for clearness.

short form shows that it (and not the suppressed elements) contains the essence of the thought.<sup>1</sup> The bearing of this upon the main proposition, that the verb does not necessarily contain the essence of a condition, is obvious.

The propositions then maintained under this heading are: (a) the verb is not always the essential part of a *si*-clause; (b) *si*-clauses which stress some word other than the verb are closely allied to that form of sentence, complex in function but simple in form, which by a single word represents the essence of a condition.

These observations may be applied to the following passage:

p. Rab. Perd. 5. 15: nisi forte hanc condicionem vobis esse vultis, quam *servi*, si libertatis spem propositam non haberent, ferre nullo modo possent.

In this sentence *servi* plays the part of a *si*-clause, and the formal *si*-clause is a proviso: '... a state of affairs which, were *slaves* (not we) concerned, would be intolerable, in case no hope of freedom were held out.'

## II. *A Peculiar Variety of the Imperfect-Pluperfect Form.*

The imperfect-pluperfect form is the least used of the four, in the Orations; 41 cases are found, the majority of which claim discussion under another heading. The present discussion deals with those cases which have the imperfect subjunctive in protasis opposed to a definitely past reality, e. g. something that occurred in the lives of people long since dead; nine such cases were noted, as well as the fact that they have a common characteristic in function, which may explain the use of the tense. Four cases will be quoted in full, and along with them three cases of the pluperfect-pluperfect form for purposes of comparison:—

p. Mil. 17. 45: ... quos clamores, nisi ad cogitatum facinus *adproperaret*, numquam reliquisset.

<sup>1</sup> The same shortening of form may be observed in English. Some one comes to visit a sick friend and says, 'If you *were well*, we would climb the mountain to-day'; the stress is here upon the verbal idea, which is in antithesis to *sickness*. A few minutes later, with a changed point of view, the friend might say, 'If *John* were sick, he would not complain as *you* do'; now the antithesis is different: sickness and health are not the things uppermost in the speaker's mind, but the diverse conduct of two people under like circumstances is; hence the stress on *John*. Suppose the last sentence had been simply, '*John* would not complain as you do': the emphatic word that marks the antithesis performs the function of a conditional clause.

p. Mil. 10. 27: . . . quam (contionem), nisi obire facinoris locum tempusque *voluisset*, numquam reliquisset.

p. Mur. 14. 32: quo (i. e. to war) ille, cum esset . . . talis . . . , numquam . . . esset profectus, si cum mulierculis bellandum *arbitraretur*. Neque vero cum P. Africano senatus egisset ut . . . proficisceretur, . . . nisi illud grave bellum . . . *putaretur*.

p. Mur. 16. 34: si bellum hoc, si hic hostis . . . contemnendus *fuisset*, neque tanta cura senatus . . . suscipiendum putasset, neque tot annos gessisset . . .

in Verr. II 5. 51. 133: . . . tuus hospes Cleomenes hoc dicit, sese in terram esse egressum, ut . . . milites colligeret, quos in navibus collocaret: quod certe non fecisset, si suum numerum naves *haberent*.

Phil. III 3. 6: reliquit consulem: quod profecto non fecisset, si eum consulem *iudicasset*, quem . . .

Cp. p. Plancio 22. 53, p. Arch. 7. 16; also in Verr. II 3. 39. 89, II 3. 58. 134, p. Cael. 6. 14.

It will be noted that the examples quoted in full are arranged in pairs, imperfect-pluperfect forms being joined in each case with a pluperfect-pluperfect form: the first pair refer to the *same* time and event, in words almost identical, the other pairs refer to *like* situations, so far as time is concerned.

All nine sentences of the imperfect-pluperfect form now under discussion have a peculiarity that may be illustrated by p. Mur. 14. 32 (quoted above). Cicero is showing that a war with Eastern nations is not a thing to be despised, and says, 'to which war he (Cato) would never have gone, if he had believed he was to fight with weaklings,' referring to the war with Antiochus. This sentence is used as a *logical instrument*: it is a matter of history that Cato did go to the war, and Cicero adduces that fact to prove that Cato believed the foe worthy of his steel. Compare the following sentences:

(a) If Rome were a small city (opposed to a well-known fact), it would fall an easy prey to the Gauls.

(b) It rained last night; for the flowers would not be so fresh, if it had not rained last night.

The Latin sentences under discussion are like the latter of these. The difference between the English sentences is this: in the first the protasis is unreal beyond question and is the starting-point of the sentence; in the second the apodosis is unreal beyond question, and its unreality is the thing that establishes

the unreality of the protasis—which last is the aim and purpose of the sentence. The thought underlying is really in the form of syllogism; e. g., p. Mur. 14. 32 (explained above) implies some such reasoning as this:

(1) Cato was not a man to go to war against a foe unworthy his steel.

(2) He went to the war against Antiochus.

(3) Therefore he thought the war no easy work.

This scores a point in favor of Cicero's contention that an Eastern war is an important undertaking. In accordance with its function, I venture to apply to this type of conditional sentence the name 'inferential'.<sup>1</sup> It will be found that this usage is marked by *enim*, *certe*, *profecto* and *numquam* (in its sense of emphatic negation); however, these particles are not confined to this usage, and their mere presence is no indication that the sentence is inferential: the real test is, does the unreality of the protasis need proof, and is the speaker trying to establish its validity? If so, the cases are genuine.

If this peculiar usage, found in all the cases, is the reason for the use of the imperfect subjunctive where opposition to a definite past is intended, it may have come about in this way: the essence of inferential sentences of the form under discussion is, 'this or that would (or would not) have happened, if (or unless) *it were true that . . .*'; that is, the thing the speaker is anxious to establish is *the unreality of the protasis*, and may therefore choose the form of simple unreality, letting the consideration of a time-element take a subordinate place; this is tentative, of course, but seems a reasonable explanation.

If the cases given at the beginning of this topic be examined, it will be seen that the sentences of the pluperfect-pluperfect form have this same inferential force: there seems to be no other formal difference between these and those of the imperfect-pluperfect form than the tense of the verb, nor any difference of function. If that be the fact, then the choice of tense must be a

<sup>1</sup>The latest edition of Harkness' Grammar cites a solitary case of this sort, Cic. Brutus 10. 40, assigning the original tense-force of the imperfect as explanation: *nec tamen dubito quin habuerit vim magnam semper oratio. Neque enim . . . tantum laudis in dicendo Ulixi tribuisset Homerus et Nestori, . . . nisi iam tum esset honos eloquentiae, neque ipse . . . orator fuisset.* This is quite like the cases now being dealt with, and comes in for a share of the same explanation. Cp. Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, §412.



purely subjective matter, the pluperfect-pluperfect form preserving the normal tense-distinction, and the imperfect-pluperfect form allowing the time-element to slip into the background under the stress of another conception; this explanation of the workings of subjectivity is, of course, also tentative.

### III. *Use of Tenses.*

The unreal conditional sentence employs a set of forms which no longer have the tense-force proper to them, but lend themselves to the expression of a new category, i. e. unreality. Despite this lack of proper tense-force, such sentences can be given a quasi-temporal classification according to the time-relations of the realities to which they are opposed; these, of course, have normal temporal relations, and, as it were, reflect these on the conditions and conclusions opposed to them. Two tense-forms then, the imperfect and pluperfect, bear the reflected light of various sorts of realities: the present discussion will deal with these.

#### A. *Imperfect Subjunctive.*

In this tense will be found correspondences to

(a) *A General Truth.*—p. Caec. 18. 53: *Voluntas, quae si tacitis nobis intellegi posset, verbis omnino non uteremur.*

p. Clu. 50. 139: *Nam si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent, nemo adhiberet oratorem.*

p. Arch. 11. 29: *Certe, si nihil animus praesentiret in posterum . . . , nec tantis se laboribus frangeret neque . . . dimicaret.*

(b) *A Fact Somewhat Time-limited but not Confined to the Immediate Present.*—p. Sex. Rosc. 30. 83: *Nam si mihi liberet accusare, accusarem alios potius, ex quibus possem crescere.*

p. Quinct. 1. 1: *Neque hoc tanto opere querendum videretur haec summa in illis esse, si in nobis essent saltem mediocria.*

These protases refer to Cicero's ability or attitude, and need not be restricted to the time of speaking, yet they are, in the nature of things, time-limited. Cp. p. Quinct. 27. 85, in Cat. I 7. 17.

(c) *An Immediate Present.*—p. Font. 15. 34: *Si M. Fonteium, iudices, in causa deficerent omnia, si turpi adulescentia . . . in iudicium vocaretur, . . . esset vobis magnopere providendum, ne . . .*

in Verr. II 2. 73. 180: Si illi . . . *nunc* idem in eum iudices essent, istum sine dubio condemnarent . . .

These protases refer to the time of the law-cases in which Cicero is at the time engaged. Cf. p. Sex. Rosc. 51. 149. In practice this seems often regarded as the normal signification of the imperfect subjunctive: in point of fact examples are rather hard to find.

(d) *A Historical Present*.—p. Sulla 13. 36 and 38: Si *respondisset* idem sentire et secum facere Sullam, tamen mihi non videretur in hunc id criminosum esse debere . . . 'Non purgat' inquit. Dixi antea: ne si *argueret* quidem tum denique cum esset interrogatus, id mihi criminosum videretur.

In these two passages Cicero is speaking of the same past event, and the sudden change from pluperfect to imperfect can hardly be accounted for except on the hypothesis that the historical present between the two passages influences the latter. A historical present precedes and follows p. Sest. 64. 134. Cp. in Verr. II 2. 40. 99 and possibly II 3. 20. 52, II 3. 56. 129: the last two are inferential in function, and the tense of their protases may come under that explanation.

It will be noted that the time-relations reflected are those of the present indicative. The examples given illustrate the use in protasis: classes (a), (b) and (c) might be illustrated in the same way in apodosis; no case of (d) was noted.

This tense has still another use in unreal conditions—namely, opposition to a future;—this is reserved for special treatment and may for convenience be classed with (c) for the present.

## B. *Pluperfect Subjunctive*.

In the use of this tense there will be found correspondences to

(1) *A Preterite*.—in Verr. II 2. 56. 139: *Postero anno* L. Metellus mentionem tui census fieri vetat: . . . Hoc si tuus inimicus fecisset, tamen . . . iudicium grave videretur.

p. Quinct. 9. 33: . . . quod *hesterno die* fecerunt . . . : quam rem facile a praetore impetrassent, nisi . . . docuisses. In the context is found the definite past time referred to. Cp. in Verr. II 2. 57. 140, Phil. II 15. 37; and for the same use in apodosis, Phil. II 11. 26.

(2) *A True Perfect*.—p. Mur. 13. 29: In qua (i. e. an orator's skill) si satis profecissem, parcius de eius laude dicerem: i. e. 'If I had up to this time attained and now had.'

p. Sulla 7. 22: Nisi tu, inquit, causam recepisses, numquam mihi restitisset, sed . . .

For a similar use in apodosis see Phil. II 36. 90, X 4. 9.

Throughout the rest of this discussion I should like to refer to the uses of the imperfect as (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*), indicating (as above) opposition to a general truth, to a reality somewhat time-limited but not confined to the immediate present, and to an immediate present; and to the uses of the pluperfect as (1) and (2), indicating opposition to a preterite and a true perfect.

The distinctions that have just been made on the basis of the time of the realities opposed may be applied to the solution of a problem that at first sight appears difficult—namely, to assign a reason why the imperfect-pluperfect form should exhibit only 41 cases and the pluperfect-imperfect 132.

Nine of the 41 cases of imperfect-pluperfect form have already been disposed of as inferential: of the remaining 32<sup>1</sup> most are of the form (*a*) or (*b*)+(1) or (2), and one or two have the form (*c*)+(2); (*c*)+(1) is conspicuously absent, and herein lies at least part of the reason for the numerical disparity noted above.<sup>2</sup> The meaning of the formulae given in the last sentence is this: (*a*) or (*b*)+(1) means a more or less general unreality, paired with an opposition to concrete past reality, e. g.:

Phil. II 28. 70: Nam si dignitas significaretur in nomine, dixisset, credo, aliquando avus tuus se et consulem et Antonium.

Just as we may say in English, 'If I *had* not the greatest confidence in you, I should have been very much frightened.' The justification for such sentences is of course that the more or less general unreality is opposed to a reality that extends into the past as well as covers the immediate present. (*a*) or (*b*)+(2) is a still easier combination, for (2) is opposed to a reality that extends from the past up to and includes the present: such a case may be

<sup>1</sup> The list is: p. Quinct. 14. 46; p. Sex. Rosc. 26. 72; in Verr. I 2. 5, II 1. 53. 139, II 1. 57. 150, II 2. 1. 3, II 2. 24. 58, II 2. 40. 99, II 2. 52. 130, II 3. 64. 150, II 3. 92. 215; p. Font. 18. 40; p. Clu. 66. 189; p. Rab. Perd. 6. 18; in Cat. I 12. 29, II 2. 3; p. Mur. 4. 8, 8. 17, 23. 46; p. Flac. 5. 11; post red. in sen. 14. 34; de dom. 51. 132; p. Sest. 20. 45; p. Cael. 29. 69; p. Planc. 17. 43; p. Deio. 9. 25; Phil. II 2. 3, II 28. 70, V 1. 1, VI 3. 6, XIII 13. 28; p. Mil. 23. 61.

<sup>2</sup> An attempt to form a sentence of the imperfect-pluperfect type on the norm (*c*)+(1) will show the limitations of that type; e. g. 'If you were well *to-day*, we would have climbed the mountains *yesterday*.' The reason that this form of sentence is avoided, is obvious.

Phil. V 1. 1: ... sic me perturbasset ejus sententia ... nisi vestrae virtuti constantiaeque confiderem, i. e. 'I should have been disturbed and should now be so.'

(c)+(2) would be explained by the same elastic use of the pluperfect.

p. Mur. 23. 46: Sed tota illa lex accusationem tuam, si haberes nocentem reum, fortasse armasset.

This securing of logical exactness only by the elastic meaning of one or both members gives a feeling that the imperfect-pluperfect form had no very special mission to perform, but is a sort of weak variety of the imperfect-imperfect and pluperfect-pluperfect forms. In pleasing contrast is the rugged strength of the pluperfect-imperfect form: it is opposed to realities related as cause and effect which work from past to present, and hence uses pluperfect and imperfect in their narrowest significations freely; e. g.:

Phil. II 15. 37: *Quo quidem tempore*, si ... meum consilium ... valuisset, tu *hodie* egeres ... Cf. Phil. III 1. 2, IV 1. 1.

As we might say in English, 'If I had taken better care of myself that winter ten years ago, I should be in better health to-day,' i. e. 'I neglected my health ten years ago, and *therefore* suffer now.' These two sentences are of the form (1)+(c), expressing opposition to a definite past and a definite present. I think that the mission of the pluperfect-imperfect form to express opposition to these causal connections will be found one of the causes of its more frequent use.

#### IV. *Si-Concessive*.

The use of *si*-concessive is very frequent in the Orations: 72 cases have their apodosis marked by *tamen*<sup>1</sup>—a very large number when it is considered that the total number of cases treated is less than 500. This number might be swelled a little by the addition of other cases that have concessive force but are not marked by *tamen*.<sup>2</sup>

de prov. cons. 20. 47: Ego, si essent inimicitiae mihi cum C. Caesare, *tamen* hoc tempore rei publicae consulere ... deberem.

<sup>1</sup> Distributed as follows: imperfect-imperfect form, 43 (of total 214); imperfect-pluperfect, 4 (of 41); pluperfect-imperfect, 20 (of 108); pluperfect-pluperfect, 5 (of 132).

<sup>2</sup> in Verr. II 4. 31. 70, p. Sulla 13. 38 (ne ... quidem), de prov. cons. 5. 10, p. Sest. 12. 28, 29. 62 (nihilominus), Phil. I 8. 20.

in Caecil. 19. 61: Ego, si superior ceteris rebus esses, hanc unam ob causam te . . . repudiari putarem oportere.

If the last case be examined, it will appear that the apodosis is not unreal; if it were, it would make Cicero imply that he did not think Caecilius should be rejected for this one cause: on the contrary, he means to say that he *does* think so, and *would still* do so even were there mitigating circumstances; that, in general, is the force of the apodosis in this use.

Though the *si*-clause itself seems to suffer no change when used to express concession, so far as form is concerned, it would not be unnatural to suppose that a speaker could prepare his hearer for the kind of apodosis that was to follow; in English we do this by the *tone of voice*, e. g.:

(1) If I were *rich*, I should not be as saving as I am.

(2) If I were *rich*, I should still be as saving as I am.

If these sentences are read with a view to bringing out the thought clearly, it will be found that the stress in each condition falls on the word *rich*, but that the *tone* in which it is pronounced varies.

Figures are not at hand to make possible a comparison of the frequency of this concessive use, in the Orations and other styles; apparently the proportion is large here, and, if so, it may be due to the fact that the sentences are to be *spoken*: this gives a chance for the element of tone to enter. On the written page, as said above, we get no clue to the meaning of the *si*-clause till the apodosis is reached.

## V. *Verb-meaning.*

Verbs of *action* in the imperfect tense will be discussed under this heading.

### A. *In Protasis.*

It will be remembered that three main classes of reality are opposed by the imperfect subjunctive; (*a*) general truth, (*b*) a reality somewhat time-limited, and (*c*) a reality of the immediate present. To render these into English we have two forms at our disposal, 'if they talked' and 'if they were talking'; (*a*) and (*b*) are correctly translated by the first of these; e. g. 'if men talked less, they would less often get into trouble' and 'if I talked for my own ends, my audiences would be smaller'.<sup>1</sup> Class (*c*) sometimes can be rendered by the second English form:

<sup>1</sup> The second English form would be possible for this last.

p. Deio. 2. 6: Hanc enim causam, C. Caesar, si in foro dicerem, . . . quantam mihi alacritatem populi Romani concursus adferret!

Here the idea of action is almost merged into that of a state, hence we may render 'if I *were speaking* in the Forum.'

Aside from such cases, one has the feeling that verbs of action in protases of Class (c) do not fit into the category of unreality in the same natural way that the verbs do which denote a state.

p. Quinct. 26. 81: Si enim illud diceres, improbe mentiri viderere.

in Verr. II 3. 72. 169: Si hercle te tuam pecuniam praetorem in provincia faeneratum docerem, tamen effugere non posses.

p. Mur. 3. 5: Etenim, si largitionem factam esse confiterer idque recte factum esse defenderem, facerem improbe . . .

p. Rab. Post. 7. 18: Si iam vobis nuntiaretur in senatu sententias dici, ut his legibus teneremini, concurrendum ad curiam putaretis; si lex de ea re ferretur, convolaretis ad rostra.

p. Mil. 28. 77: Quam ob rem, si cruentum gladium tenens clamaret T. Annius . . .: esset vero timendum, quonam modo id ferret civitas.

The Latin is consistent in holding these sentences down to the unreal form, but I think an English speaker with the same ideas to express would choose a different form; e. g. the last case cited might be rendered 'if Milo *were to take* a bloody sword and cry aloud . . .' (implying that he is doing no such thing and is unlikely to do it); the preceding example might be rendered 'if it *should be announced* to you' (vague supposition).<sup>1</sup> The Latin too shows some indication that a future idea is not far removed from these verbs of action in protasis:

in Verr. II 1. 17. 44: nihil *dicam* . . . nisi id, quod si in alium reum *diceretur*, incredibile videretur.

in Caecil. 13. 43: Ac si tibi nemo *responsurus esset*, tamen ipsam causam . . . demonstrare non posses.

In the first case the time is set by *dicam*: Cicero is simply telling what he is *going to say*, and *diceretur* must reflect the time of *dicam*.<sup>2</sup> It may be remembered that when Class (c) was first

<sup>1</sup> A really remarkable case of this sort may be found in p. Caec. 30. 88, where Cicero uses a full conditional sentence in a simile, strangely enough choosing the unreal form where we certainly would use the other.

<sup>2</sup> It has already been shown that the essence of this clause lies in *alium*; the unreality implied by this word may help in holding the verb down to the unreal form.

defined it was made large enough to include such cases as this, opposed to a future.

Latin may be said, then, to be a little more conservative than the English in holding to the unreal form.

### B. *In Apodosis.*

Here the verbs of action are clearly opposed to a future, as shown by the following defined cases<sup>1</sup>:

p. Sex. Rosc. 30. 83: Neque enim id *facerem* nisi necesse esset, et id *erit* signi me invitum facere, quod non *persequar* longius quam salus huius et mea fides *postulabit*.

p. Rab. Perd. 6. 19: Lubenter, inquam, confiterer, si vere possem . . . ; sed, quoniam id facere non possum, *confitebor* id, quod . . .

p. Sulla 1. 2: . . . cum huius (Sullae) periculi propulsione *coniungam* defensionem officii mei. Quo quidem genere orationis non uter, si . . . mea solum interesset. Cp. 3. 10, 16. 47 and p. Flacc. 16. 38.

We are at no loss to render these into English: our ambiguous form of apodosis with *would* and *should* meets the issue very well.

The suggestions offered in this paper may perhaps have brought into light, or, at least, into clearer light, some of the forces that are at work in the conditional sentence.

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<sup>1</sup> By defined cases is meant those whose context throws light upon the meaning of the words with which we are dealing; just as in the sentence Utatur sane: non peto, the independent subjunctive standing alone might have many shades of meaning; but *sane* and *non peto* settle beyond a doubt that concession is intended. Just so here the futures in the context throw light upon the time to which the imperfect subjunctive is opposed.